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Abstract 
In recent years, Azerbaijan has positioned itself on the international scene as an increasingly important and 
assertive actor. This essay focuses RQ$]HUEDLMDQ¶VUHODWLRQVZLWKWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ(8,WZLOO identify the 
policy strategies used by Azerbaijan to engage with the EU in two areas where their interests and objectives do 
not align, namely democracy and human-rights promotion policies, and agenda-setting of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict. The essay highlights, first, the relevance of QDWLRQDOLQGHSHQGHQFHµEDODQFLQJ¶DQG regime legitimacy in 
H[SODLQLQJ $]HUEDLMDQ¶V IRUHLJQ SRlicy strategies, and second, the mixed track record of AzerbaiMDQ¶V
assertiveness, with different outcomes depending on whether the policy strategies are reactive or proactive. 
 
 
SINCE ITS INDEPENDENCE IN 1991, AZERBAIJAN¶S HAS ENGAGED IN bilateral relations with the European Union 
(EU). Relations have intensified over the course of this period and been amiable. Yet in recent years$]HUEDLMDQ¶V
approach to the EU has become increasingly confrontational, as it demands policies that take into account Baku¶V
national interests and viewpoints. In line with the aims of this special issue, this essay will critically assess the 
(8¶VLQIOXHQFHRQ$]HUEDLMDQ¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\ by examining how the latter anticipates and reacts to the EU in 
formulating its foreign policy. The essay will examine how Azerbaijan has used various policy strategies to further 
its own objectives in areas where the two sides hold different views or interests. 
An oft-held view of EU±Azerbaijan relations is that they are based primarily on pragmatic 
considerations: while the EU seeks to maintain good relations to secure its energy imports1, Azerbaijan sees these 
relations as fulfilling its economic interests without requiring too many political commitments in return (Rasizade 






2003).2 While economic cooperation is indeed the main dimension of EU±Azerbaijan relations, not all areas of 
cooperation can be seen in this light. There are several non-economic domains where one of the two seeks further 
engagement, despite this causing a certain level of friction in the relationship. Two such areas are democracy and 
human rights (DHR) promotion, and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  
The literature that aims to explain the dynamics of EU±Azerbaijan relations has been weighted towards 
research and theorising from the EU perspective (Nuriyev 2008; Pace 2009; Schimmelfennig & Scholtz 2010; 
Wetzel 2011; Raik 2011). Other studies have carefully analysed $]HUEDLMDQ¶V historical and political legacies, but 
without examining these in light of relations with the EU [Please rewrite the highlighted text completely]. (see for 
instance Goldenberg 1994; Herzig 1999; &RUQHOO  %|ONEDúÕ ; Assenova & Shiriyev 2015). To 
XQGHUVWDQGWKHORJLFEHKLQG%UXVVHOV¶DQG%DNX¶VGHVLUHWRDGGUHVVWKHLVVXHVRI'+5promotion and Nagorno-
Karabakh respectively, without seeming prepared to make any compromises, we do however need to look beyond 
separate accounts of their behaviour. To this end, this essay will DOVRLQFOXGH$]HUEDLMDQ¶VSHUVSHFWLYHDVDQDFWLYH
player in its interaction with the European Union.  
The essay has three main goals. First, it aims to explore $]HUEDLMDQ¶VDFWLYHUROHLQUHODWLRQVZLWKWKH(8
WKHUHE\FRPSOHPHQWLQJWKHPDQ\VWXGLHVWKDWKDYHDOUHDG\ORRNHGDWWKH(8¶VSHUVSHFWLYH The second aim is to 
understand how the foreign policies and strategies of Azerbaijan and the EU are influenced by their respective 
legacies. For the EU, this is WKHLGHDRIEHLQJDWUDQVIRUPDWLYHSRZHU$]HUEDLMDQ¶VOHJDFLHVFDQEHVHHQLQOLJKW
RIWKHFRQFHSWVRIQDWLRQDOLQGHSHQGHQFHµEDODQFLQJ¶DQGUHJLPHOHJLWLPDF\ The essay finds that not only has 
the EU not succeeded in EULQJLQJ$]HUEDLMDQ¶VSROLFLHVPRUHLQOLQHZLWKWKH(8¶V agenda, but through its own 
policies towards Azerbaijan, the EU has²possibly in an unintentional and indirect manner²reinforced 
$]HUEDLMDQ¶VHPSKDVLVRQQDWLRQDOLQGHSHQGHQFH 
Third, this essay demonstrates that the ability of actors to further their own objectives in bilateral relations 
differs according to whether they are engaging in reactive or proactive policy formulation. The different outcomes 
related to proactive or reactive foreign policy strategies will EHOLQNHGWRWKHQRWLRQVRIµRIIHQVLYH¶ DQGµGHIHQVLYH¶ 
power (Goldmann in Goldmann & Sjöstedt 1979). Offensive power enables actor A to make actor B do something; 
defensive power is possessed by B enabling B to resist such attempts by A (Goldmann in Goldmann & Sjöstedt 
1979, pp. 13±4). Therefore, Goldmann believes, µthe expression ³the power of an actor´ may refer both to the 
ability of the actor to control others (i.e., his role as A) and to his ability to avoid being controlled by others (i.e. 
his role as B)¶ (Goldmann in Goldmann & Sjöstedt 1979, p. 14). The essay finds that in both case studies, the only 
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form of influence that can be gained by the EU or Azerbaijan is defensive in nature, that is, by the actor taking 
the reactive position. Proactive policy strategies, which could potentially result in offensive power, have been 
largely unsuccessful for both the EU and Azerbaijan. For Baku, being on the receiving end of proactive EU 
policies has served, in some cases, to reinforce its defensive power, which Baku has not hesitated to use. It is this 
strategic use of defensive power that makes Azerbaijan such an exceptional case, and an outlier in the post-Soviet 
region.  
The analysis of KRZ(8SROLFLHVDIIHFW$]HUEDLMDQ¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\ZLOOEHEDVHGRQWZRFDVHVWXGLHV
7KHILUVWLVDQDUHDZKHUHWKH(8¶VGHVLUHWREULQJDERXWchange in Azerbaijan is the most visible, namely DHR 
SURPRWLRQ$]HUEDLMDQ¶VSROLFLHVDUH mostly reactive in this regard. The second case concerns agenda-setting of 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, where Azerbaijan takes the proactive role and the EU reacts.  
The HVVD\¶VGXDODQDO\WLFDOIRFXVLVpredominantly based on data from policy documents and interviews 
conducted during fieldwork in Baku and Brussels in 2014, 2015 and 2017.3 Interview data was used to create a 
comprehensive picture of the different policy strategies used by the two sides in their efforts to influence policy 
outcomes to their own benefit. Additional evidence has been gathered from the literature, policy papers and media 
reports in order cross-check and/or add details to the narratives. It needs to be acknowledged that these sources 
have their limitations: Azerbaijan being a relatively closed country in the sense that politics cannot always be 
discussed freely, it proved  difficult to collect full and unbiased information. 
It should be emphasised that the views discussed are those of members and officials belonging to parts 
of the Azerbaijani government and the EU institutions that are involved in official relations between the two actors 
in question.4 The essay does not aim to capture the views of all political actors or of Azerbaijani and EU citizens 
as such. The time span covered in this essay is 2010±2017, although there are various references to specific events 
that occurred prior to 2010. 
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 For reasons of confidentiality, interviewees have been anonymised. This essay is based on interviews with 23 
persons, a total of 37 hours of conversation. Interviewees were affiliated with the EU institutions and actors (11) 
or the Azerbaijani authorities (7) or were independent experts, working for e.g. think tanks and CSOs (5). Not all 
interviewees have been directly referenced in this essay. 
4
 For the EU, this refers mainly to the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the EU Delegation 
in Baku, as well as the European Commission. For Azerbaijan, it is more difficult to decipher who exactly is in 
charge of formulating foreign policy strategies; however, given the more centralised decision-making structures, 





foreign policy stances regarding DHR promotion and the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Subsequently, it will 
unpack the two case studies of DHR promotion and agenda-setting of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, focusing 
on the differing positions of Brussels and Baku and analysing which policy strategies have been used over time 
by the latter in order to bring policy outcomes more in line with its own interests. The conclusions and discussion 
section will bring together the main points on legacies, reactive and proactive foreign policy strategies, and the 
RXWFRPHVLQWHUPVRIµRIIHQVLYH¶DQGµGHIHQVLYH¶SRZHU 
  
EU and Azerbaijan legacies influencing their current policies  
7KH(8¶VYLHZVWUDWHJLFLQWHUHVWVDQGXQLYHUVDOYDOXHV 
Relations between Azerbaijan and the EU have developed and become closer over the past two decades since 
$]HUEDLMDQ¶VLQGHSHQGHQFHLQ$WILUVWUHODWLRQVZHUHPRVWO\IRcused on technical assistance ('HPLUD÷
p. 91; EC 2007, p. 15), necessitated by the collapse of $]HUEDLMDQ¶Veconomy and the war with Armenia over 
Nagorno-Karabakh between 1988 and 1994. In later policy frameworks, especially the European Neighbourhood 
Policy (ENP 2003) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP 2009), a stronger emphasis was placed on EU values. The 
EU perceives itself as a transformative, norm-promoting foreign policy actor (Sjöstedt 1977, p. 122; Whitman 
1998; Rosecrance in Zielonka 1998, p. 22; Manners 2000, p. 35, 2002, p. 252), and as such is considered µa new 
type of international actor¶ (Rosecrance in Zielonka 1998, p. 15).5 This perceived role as norm promoter influences 
its behaviour towards Azerbaijan (Sjursen in Elgström & Smith 2006, p. 85), VSHFLILFDOO\WKH(8¶VLQFOXVLRQRI
so many transformative objectives in these relations (Lucarelli & Manners 2006, pp. 3±4; Orbie 2008, p. 2; 
Kavalski 2012, p. 85), even when this may compete or even clash with other interests, such as trade and energy 
security (Warkotsch 2006). Such objectives include: democratisation; good governance; protection of the rule of 
law, human rights and fundamental freedoms; market economy reforms and World Trade Organization (WTO) 
accession; and commitment to international law (EC 1996, 2004). The EU has been often criticised by scholars 
and commentators for allowing the significant material and strategic interests at stake to hinder a more in-depth 
values promotion policy in regard to Azerbaijan (Warkotsch 2006; Gahramanova 2009; Youngs 2010); while this 
PD\EHWUXHWRVRPHH[WHQWWKHIDFWLVWKDWPDQ\RIWKH(8¶VSROLFLHVWRZDUGV$]HUEDLMDQGRKDYHDFOHDUYDOXHV
dimension, and this approach regularly leads to diplomatic tensionsin relations with the government in Baku.  
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The QRUPDWLYHQDWXUHRIWKH(8¶VH[WHUQDOSROLFLHVis however not unproblematic. First, Baku does not 
UHFRJQLVH WKH (8¶V OHJLWLPDF\ LQ SURPRWLQJ LWV QRUPV DEURDG 7KH (8¶V REMHFWLYHV FODVK ZLWK $]HUEDLMDQ¶V
growing demand to be acknowledged as an equal partner and its foreign policy focus on independence, balancing 
and internal regime legitimDF\6HFRQGWKH(8¶V transformative efforts with regard to Azerbaijan have so far 
been largely fruitless. As will be shown in the subsequent case studies, the µeconomic and coercive forms of 
power¶ needed to enforce normative power (Vogt in Mayer & Vogt 2006, p. 8) are limited because of the greater 
symmetry in relations. This essay therefore tries to understand how (and why) the Azerbaijani government 
responds to EU transformative pressure.  
 
$]HUEDLMDQ¶VOHJDFies: independence and Heydar Aliyev 
Much of $]HUEDLMDQ¶VFXUUHQWIRUHLJQSROLF\VWUDWHJ\ZDVLQLWLDWHGE\IRUPHUSUHVLGHQW+H\GDU$OL\HY during his 
term in office (1994±2003)$OL\HYFDPHWRSRZHUVKRUWO\DIWHUWKHFRXQWU\¶VLQGHSHQGHQFHDQGOHIWDFOHDUPDUN
on Azerbaijani foreign policy. He establLVKHG WKH VWUDWHJ\ RI µEDODQFLQJ¶ WKURXJK ZKLFK KH WULHG WR DSSHDVH
neighbouring countries and regional powers, as a way of securing national independence (Huseynov 2009; 
%|ONEDúÕS%DOFLøEUDKLPRYES6  
 $OL\HY¶VRULJLQDO Vtrategy is evident in the FRXQWU\¶V current balancing approach, which has allowed 
Azerbaijan to maintain stable relations with almost all its neighbouring countries (Iran, Turkey, Georgia and 
Russia) as well as other regional actors with potential influence over the country (the EU, Ukraine, Israel). 
$OL\HY¶VDSSURDFKZDVWRJDLQWKHJRRGZLOORIDOOVXUURXQGLQJFRXQWULHVE\SURPLVLQJWKHPVKDUHVLQWKHRLOVHFWRU; 
he WKXV JXDUDQWHHG WKH FRXQWU\¶V LQGHSHQGHQFH DQG VLPXOWDQHRXVO\ JHQHUDWHG WKH UHYHQXHV WKDW underlie the 
country¶Vcurrent boom %|ONEDúÕS7 µ%DODQFLQJ¶RUµPXOWL-YHFWRU¶ policies are not unique in the 
region (Idan & Shaffer 2011; Gnedina 2015), but the extent to which Baku maintains active and friendly relations 
with other states in WKHUHJLRQLVUHPDUNDEO\KLJKHVSHFLDOO\JLYHQWKHFRXQWU\¶VVL]H 
$IWHU$OL\HY¶VGHDWK in 2003, his son Ilham Aliyev was elected to succeed him (Aliyev 2008, p. 175; 
Jeffries 2003, p. 7). $QLPSRUWDQWSDUWRI$]HUEDLMDQ¶Vcontemporary identity construction is the personality cult 
DURXQG+H\GDU$OL\HY%|ONEDúÕS&RUQHOOS In terms of foreign policy, Ilham Aliyev 
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 Heydar Aliyev also made references to the pre-Soviet independent republicʊthe Azerbaijan 
Democratic RepublicʊWKDWH[LVWHGIURPWRDQGPXFKRI$]HUEDLMDQ¶VSRVW-Soviet foreign policy is said 
to have similarities with that of the ADR (Yusifzade in ADA 2008, p. 6). 
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FRQWLQXHGWKHµEDODQFLQJ¶VWUDWHJ\DQGUHIHUHQFHVWR+H\GDU$OL\HY¶VOHJDF\DUHnormally part of A]HUEDLMDQ¶V 
political discourse. A key difference between the leadership of father and son is that the current regime has become 
much more assertive and goes to greater lengths to promote WKHUHJLPH¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOLPDJH, enabled in this by 
WKHFRXQWU\¶VHnergy resources.8 There is both an external and internal dimension to this national self-promotion. 
The external dimension²identity-building²FDQ EH H[SODLQHG E\ WKH FRXQWU\¶V desire for international 
recognition,9 and is achieved through Public Relations and the creation of façades such as distinct architectural 
projects and the organisation of large international events.10 Internal propaganda promoting the idea of Azerbaijan 
as a wealthy and internationally confident country able to resist the agendas set by external powers serves to 
maintain internal legitimacy and quell domestic criticism.11  
As it will be shown through this essay PXFK RI $]HUEDLMDQ¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ LV EXLOW DURXQG the 
imperatives of balancing, independence and internal regime legitimacy. Because of these imperatives, the 
government is not interested in closer cooperation with the EU. While the EU traditionally deals with neighbouring 
countries seeking closer cooperation and even integration with the EU, Azerbaijan has been named by scholars as 
DµOHDVW OLNHO\¶FDVH IRU(8DFFHVVLRQEHIRUHDORQJZLWK%HODUXV (Franke et al. 2010, p. 156).The Azerbaijani 
government is simply not interested in, and as an insufficiently democratic regime does furthermore not qualify 
for, in further integration with the EU, let alone membership (Franke et al. 2010, p. 156).12 First, Azerbaijan has 
sufficient leverage to act independently on the international stage without needing the support of EU affiliation.13 
Moreover, so far the country has fared well while refraining from membership of integration initiatives such as 
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 Interview with EU representatives 2, May 2014, Baku.  
9
 Interview with EU representative 1, May 2014, Baku. As part of the strategy, the government builds 
expensive infrastructure to bring international events to Baku, such as the Eurovision Song Festival in 2012, the 
Davos Economic Forum in 2013, the European Games in 2015, and Formula 1 in 2016 (interview with 
independent expert 2, May 2014, Baku).  
10
 Interview with EU representative1, May 2014, Baku. 
11
 Some observers see similarities between Azerbaijan and the United Arab Emirates regarding national 
identity-building (informal conversations interview with EU representative 1, April 2014, Baku). Both have 
similar ways of identity-building through prestige projects and architecture, with a focus on appearance rather 
than on content, and a strong modernisation discourse. As such, Azerbaijan could be analysed as a young oil-
producing nation rather than as a post-Soviet state per se.  
12
 Interview with EU representative 1, May 2014, Baku; interviews with EU representatives 1 and 3, May 
2014, Baku; interview with independent expert 1, May 2014, Baku.  
13
 Interview with EU representatives 1, April 2014, Baku; interviews with independent experts 1 and 2, 




the EU or Eurasian Economic Union. The ruling elite see Azerbaijan as a growing regional power, both in 
economic and political terms.14 6HFRQGWKHFRXQWU\¶VDIRUHPHQWLRQHGVWUDWHJ\RIEDOancing means that the EU is 
only one among many of Azerbaijan¶VSDUWQHUV. The government is seeking increased cooperation with Europe in 
a broader sense, but not necessarily with the EU as an actor..15 In particular, closer relations with the EU could 
negatively affect relations with Russia, which remains WKHNH\SOD\HULQ$]HUEDLMDQ¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\Warkotsch 
2006, p. 519).16 Lastly, Baku considers the EU¶V emphasis on values to be µLQWHUIHUHQFH LQ GRPHVWLF DIIDLUV¶
(Cornell 2011, p. 395; Babayev 2014, p. 62).17 The government prefers to limit cooperation to technical and 
economic areas rather than seeking political partnership.18  
Cooperation in technical and economic areas is not problematic: the EU and Azerbaijan have worked 
together without friction since 1991, for example on issues of culture, education and mobility. However, those 
areas in which EU objectives are perceived to contradict $]HUEDLMDQ¶VQDWLRQDO LQWHUHVWVDUH fertile ground for 
resistance by the government in Baku. The two main areas of friction are WKH(8¶VDHR promotion policies and 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The latter LV$]HUEDLMDQ¶VPDLQsecurity priority, and the one area in which the 
government would like increased cooperation with the EU, by envisaging more engagement from Brussels with 
the conflict resolution process. DHR is a policy domain where the EU wishes to promote its own values in 
Azerbaijan, which the government sees in turn as an interference in its internal affairs. The foreign policy 
strategies used by Azerbaijan in these two policy areas will now be unpacked.  
 
 
Democracy and human rights promotion (DHR) policies 
The first case that sheds OLJKWRQ$]HUEDLMDQ¶VSROLF\VWUDWHJLHVLQits relations with the EU is DHR promotion, on 
which Brussels and Baku take almost opposite stances. DHR promotion remains one of the policy priorities of the 
EU in the ENP and EaP (EC 2004, 2011); Azerbaijan, however, does not appear interested in engaging with this 
policy instrument, and WKH(8¶VSROLFLHVKDYH not, so far, OHGWRDQ\WUDQVIRUPDWLRQVLQOLQHZLWKWKH(8¶VDLPV. 
There are considerable efforts to promote human rights, both by the supranational EU institutions as well as 
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 Interview with Azerbaijani representative 1, May 2014, Baku. 
15
 Interview with independent expert 2, May 2014, Baku.  
16
 Interview with independent expert 1, May 2014, Baku. 
17
 Interview with EU representatives 2, May 2014, Baku. 
18
 Interviews with EU representatives 1 and 2, May 2014, Baku. Technical and economic areas 





individual member (Van Gils 2017). However, arguably, the EU could be more active where it concerns the 
promotion of democracy and political reform , possibly because it clashes with other EU interests, such as the 
supply of energy. DHR promotion is therefore one of the most criticised parts of the E8¶V H[WHUQDO SROLFLHV
resulting in accusations of double standards by scholars and commentators (Balfour in Lucarelli & Manners 2006, 
p. 115). Although the Azerbaijani government and the EU regularly clash diplomatically RYHU%UXVVHOV¶QRUP
promotion, the EU does not consider putting these values aside, as they are considered fundamental principles, 
and the promotion policies have remained in place unchanged over the years.19 One explanation for this limited 
success may be found in the reactive strategies used by the government in Baku, LQIRUPHGE\WKHUHJLPH¶VOHJDF\  
$OOWKUHHHOHPHQWVRI$]HUEDLMDQ¶VSUHYLRXVO\GLVFXVVHGOHJDFLHVSOD\DUROHLQVKDSLQJLWVVWDQFHon EU 
values promotion. From an internal legitimacy point of view, the incumbent, non-democratic regime in Baku 
disproves of WKH(8¶V'+5SURPRWLRQSROLFLHV using national sovereignty as a resistance strategy. In line with 
WKHSUDFWLFHRIµEDODQFLQJ¶the government has formally committed to respecting democracy and human rights 
issues through treaties with the European Union (such as the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) from 
1996 (EC 1999, p. 22)) and other organisations such as the Council of Europe (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
Azerbaijan 2014). However, as it will be shown below, this formal commitment has not been put into practice. 
Since the Arab Spring and developments in Ukraine, 20 the regime has been particularly sensitive to any 
internal criticism. This more repressive approach has led to the arrest of journalists, youth and opposition activists, 
many of whom received lengthy prison sentences; among others journalist Afghan Mukhtarli who was arrested in 
2017; youth activists Giyas Ibahimov and Bayram Mammadov, arrested in 2016; and opposition activist Asif 
Yusufli, arrested in 2014   (Freedom House 2015; Ahmedbeyli 2016; Human Rights Watch 2016).21 In 2015, there 
ZHUHSULVRQHUVUHFRJQLVHGE\ WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\DV µSROLWLFDOSULVRQHUV¶ (6, LQ 2017 this 
number was over 150 (Amnesty International 2018). According to Guliyev this is because they are µperceived as 
DWKUHDW«WRWKHJRYHUQLQJHOLWH¶VGHVLUHWRKLGHLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWIORZVRIRLOUHYHQXHVDQGPLVDSSURSULDWLRQRI
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 Interview with EU representative 4, July 2014, Brussels.  
20
 Interview with EU representative 4, July 2014, Brussels.   
21
 µ:RUOGUHSRUW$]HUEDLMDQ¶+XPDQ5LJKWV Watch, 2015, available at: http://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2015/country-chapters/azerbaijan?page=3, accessed 14 February 2015; µ)UHHGRP LQ WKH :orld. 
Azerbaijan¶ Freedom House, available at: https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/azerbaijan#.VN-
RnSYfyM8, accessed 14 February 2015; µ$]HUEDLMDQ+XPDQULJKWVUHFRUGVWLOOQRWURDGZRUWK\DV)RUPXODKLWV
%DNX¶ Amnesty International, 16 June 2016, available at: 




public funds by elite members¶ (Guliyev 2013, p. 136). Oil revenues would also be used to contain political 
mobilisation (Guliyev 2013, p. 145) for instance by funding repression or financing welfare provisions (Guliyev 
2013; Yörük 2012). Such criticism aside, one international observer believes that there is a degree of genuine 
popular support for the government, basing their claim on the growing prosperity in the country and the lack of a 
suitable alternative to Aliyev.22 This may explain the fact that the EU and other international actors such as the 
USA government, Council of Europe and OSCE have put less emphasis on democracy promotion in Azerbaijan 
and more on human rights, condemning the growing political crackdown (EP 2014, 2015), including the cases of 
political prisoners23 and the arrests of dozens of LGBT citizens in Baku in the autumn of 2017 (Rettman 2017).  
In short, the (8¶VYDOXHVSURPRWLRQSROLFLHVDUHDSRWHQWLDOWKUHDWIRUWKHAzerbaijani government in that 
they are intended to undermine its practices. For the EU, the promotion of key liberal democratic values is 
fundamental to its status as a normative power. $]HUEDLMDQ¶VUHFHSWLRQRIWKH(8¶VSROLFLHVLQWXUQWUDQVODWHVLQWR
the use of reactive foreign policy strategies. In recent years, the government has introduced a range of reactive 
and proactive measures to circumvent and undermine WKH(8¶VSROLFLHV6HYHUDO policy tools that will be discussed 
in the next section are grouped as followed; first, ignoring pressure and expressing counter-criticism; and, second, 
lobbying and PR activities, DQGWKHXQGHUPLQLQJRIWKH(8¶VVXSSRUWWR civil society.  
 
Reactive strategies: avoiding pressure and expressing counter-criticism 
2QHRIWKH(8¶VPDLQ'+5SURPRWLRQWRROVLVWKHLVVXLQJRIRIILFLDOVWDWHPHQWVZKLFKFDQEHGRQHE\WKH(($6
the Council, or the European Parliament (EP).  
.
24
 In 2014 and 2015 the EP adopted resolutions criticising the situation of both democracy and human rights in 
Azerbaijan and called for sanctions to be imposed (EP 2014, 2015). This move caused annoyance with the 
Azerbaijani government, which retaliated by postponing a number of meetings of the Partnership and Cooperation 
Committee as well as exploratory talks over the proposed Strategic Partnership Agreement with the EEAS,25 
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causing in turn some friction between the EP and the EEAS.26 This strategy shows that when the government is 
XQDEOHWRFKDQJHWKH(8¶V'+5SURPRWLRQSROLFLHV LWVLPSO\WULHs to avoid the impact of this pressure where 
possible.  
When such counter-actions to express government displeasure are judged insufficient, the government 
responds to critical EU statements and report through counter-statements.27 Occasionally, Baku has accused the 
EU of having double standards by singling out Azerbaijan or by pointing out human rights issues within the EU,28 
such as the treatment of immigrants.29 $]HUEDLMDQIHHOV LW LVEHLQJ WUHDWHGµXQIDLUO\¶ by the EU¶V µQDPLQJDQG
VKDPLQJ¶ DSSURDFK30 Such accusations are expressed both publicly and privately between government 
representatives. 31 
'XHWRWKHIUHTXHQF\RI(8VWDWHPHQWVRQ$]HUEDLMDQ¶VKXPDQULJKWVUHFRUGRIILFLDOVLQ%DNXKDYHQRWHG
that the Azerbaijani government has become insensitive to this kind of criticism.32 Several interviewees have 
explained their opinion that public criticism is counterproductive, as Azerbaijan is very sensitive about its 
reputation.33 Indeed, the Azerbaijani government itself takes this position, and on occasions, confronts the EU 
about its public statements, noting that the regime would be more lenient about certain human rights-related issues 
if international actors would not make such a public matter of it.34 
 Currently, a number of EU actors retreated to only expressing criticism behind closed doors. As 
$]HUEDLMDQ¶V GLVVHQWLQJ media have been silenced, the net effect of this new EU attitude related to a drastic 
limitation of the Azerbaijani public¶VH[SRVXUHto these cases of human rights violations. At the same time, the 
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JRYHUQPHQW¶VFULWLFDOUHVSRQVHVWR the aforementioned EU criticism are publicly available through mainstream 
national media. In this way, the government minimises threats to its legitimacy through criticism of its HR record, 
both internal and foreign, and highlights WKHQDWLRQ¶V political and economic independence. 
 
Proactive strategies: influencing Brussels and establishing ties with civil society organisations 
%DNX¶V reactive strategies, as we have seen above, are complemented by proactive ones, such as the attempt to 
influence the policy-making and implementation processes in Brussels through lobbying and PR activities. 
Judging from scandals that emerged in recent years, this strategy appears to have been relatively effective.  
$]HUEDLMDQ¶V VR-FDOOHG µFDYLDU GLSORPDF\¶ (6,  aims at forestalling criticism of its lack of 
democracy and its human rights record, and where possible, orchestrating positive evaluations instead. After the 
2013 presidential elections it came to light that travel costs of some members of an EP Observation Mission had 
been (indirectly) covered by the Azerbaijani government (Politico EU/Vogel 2014). The mission¶V positive report 
was contradicted by the findings of the OSCE (ESI 2013; Van Gils 2017).35  
In September 2017, a more elaborate form of lobbying was revealed with the so-called µLaundromat¶ 
scandal. An international investigative team formed by different media outlets and research organisations exposed 
a large financial scheme used by the Azerbaijani government to offer financial rewards to policymakers in 
different European institutions and national governments, seemingly in return for a less critical attitude regarding 
the situation of democracy and human rights in the country.36 While the investigation confirmed rumours that had 
existed for years about the extensive Azerbaijani lobby, WKHVFDOHRI%DNX¶VHIIRUWVFDPHDVDVKRFN WRPDQ\
suggesting that lobbying and Public Relations activities in Brussels and other European capitals remains a very 
powerful tool. In response to the µLaundromat¶ scandal, the EP voted to launch an investigation into the corruption 
practices of the Azerbaijani government, calling for action to implement stricter anti-corruption measures in 
relations with Azerbaijan (EP 2017b; Rankin 2017).  
A second proactive strategy is the establishment of closer ties with civil society, to lure civil society 
organisations (CSOs) away from the EU. Civil society occupies central importance in the (8¶V'+5SURPRWLRQ 
(EU Council 2011, p. 7; EC 2012, p. 3),37 but the support available for civil society activities is not very extensive 
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(Youngs 2008, pp. 6±7øEUDKLPRYLQ9DQGHUKLOO & Aleprete . 2013, p. 131) and now the Azerbaijani government 
has started to provide alternative funding to local CSOs, themselves.38 This strategy can help protect regime 
legitimacy, since it reinforces a civil society that stays within certain boundaries set by the government itself and 
does not receive funding from external actors; NGOs that are critical of the government find themselves in 
increasingly difficult conditions to operate.39  
 
Economic decline and the preservation of defensive power 
These proactive activities can be seen as an assertion of national independence by Baku. Azerbaijan has not been 
able to change substantively EU policies²DHR promotion policies are still in place and there are no current 
indications that they will be discontinued²and therefore has not managed to gain any offensive power. Yet it has 
succeeded in undermining the implementation of the DHR promotion policies through reactive strategies to an 
extent, resulting in defensive power.  
The government has so far been able to enact these strategies because of its economic and political 
independence from the European Union. This independence is based on its oil revenues, its balancing strategy and 
its lack of interest in closer cooperation with the EU, making any attempt by Brussels to impose conditionality 
valueless.40 More recently, however, the 2015 economic downturn weakened WKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSRVLWLRQ One 
example where this diminished power has become visible are  the negotiations over the new legal basis for 
relations, to replace the 1996 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. At the start of the negotiations in 2013 
Baku was adamant that values should have no place in any new agreement (Rettman 2013; Turan Information 
Agency 2014);41 but the government has softened its stance on this principle  over the course of the past year.42   
Therefore, while Azerbaijan has had strong defensive power through its reactive policy strategies thus 
far, this position might alter7KHFRXQWU\¶VGHIHQVLYHSRZHUPD\UHPDLQKLJKZKHQLWUHOLHVRQGLSORPDWLFWDFWics 
but is likely to diminish when it comes to more costly measures such as postponing meetings or influencing 
negotiations, since the overall bargaining power of the state seems to have been reduced after 2015. Lobbying and 
Public Relations activities in Brussels are also reliant on sufficient economic strength, due to the financial costs 
required for this. For its part, the EU has not realised any of its transformative objectives in Azerbaijan nor 
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acquired any new offensive power. Overall, the status quo remains unchangedʊa favourable outcome for the 
Azerbaijani government.  
 
Agenda-setting of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
The second case study RI$]HUEDLMDQ¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\VWUDWHJ\is that of agenda-setting with regard to the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. In bilateral relations between the EU and Azerbaijan, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remains 
the most prominent policy issue in the field of security. The two actors hold different views on how the conflict 
should be addressed, informed by their respective legacies. This issue also indirectly affects progress in other 
areas of cooperation and is therefore crucial for understanding EU±Azerbaijan relations. 
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict erupted in 1988, and in 1992 the Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group obtained a mandate from the international community to mediate (De 
Waal 2010, p. 124; Babayev 2014, p. 123). A ceasefire was brokered in 1994, but the conflict has still not been 
resolved. The issue of Nagorno-KaraEDNKDURXVHVVWURQJQDWLRQDOLVWVHQWLPHQWVDQGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VOHJLWLPDF\
and authority rest to an extent on its ability to resolve the issue (Kaufman in Sperling et al. 2003, p. 62).  
The EU has always referred to the OSCE Minsk Group as having the mandate for active engagement, 
and consistently places LWV RZQ DFWLYLWLHV ZLWKLQ WKH 26&(¶V IUDPHZRUN In this sense, the EU addresses the 
conflict within an OSCE-led regional security framework, and on the basis of the principle of the µnon-use of 
force¶ (8&RXQFLO3UHVLGHQWS7KH(8¶VQRQ-involvement in the conflict is consistent with its role as 
a non-military actor emphasising mediation and peaceful conflict resolution. Over the past two decades, WKH(8¶V
role has been one of support, not that of actively brokering any settlement (Babayev 2014, p. 114).43 However, 
this specific stance contradicts WKH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ¶V broader self-perceived role as a regional security actor 
(Freire & Simão 2013). The LQFRQJUXHQFH EHWZHHQ WKH (8¶V VHOI-perceived role and its behaviour might be 
explained by practical considerations: there simply are no feasible ways of getting directly involved without 
harming relations with Russia or Armenia (Jahn in Reiter 2009, p. 266±69),44 tKH(8KDVQRµFRKHUHQWVWUDWHJ\¶
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concerning frozen conflicts (Babayev 2014, p. 114);45 and there is only limited agreement between the member 
states regarding a conflict management policy (Whitman & Wolff 2012, p. 216). Lastly, since the 1990s, Russia 
and Turkey engaged in a clearer conflict resolution strategy (Simão 2014, p. 300), potentially limiting WKH(8¶V
role in the region. In 2003, the appointment of the EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus contributed 
to partially address WKLVLVVXHHPERG\LQJWKH(8¶VVHOI-perception of mediator that speaks to all parties involved 
(Pashayeva in Chiragov et al. 2015, p. 39).  
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is possibly the only policy area in which Azerbaijan requests more, not 
less, involvement by the EU. Azerbaijan has made clear in its diplomatic relations with Brussels that it wishes the 
EU to take up a stronger role in conflict mediation, or speak up for $]HUEDLMDQ¶VWHUULWRULDOLQWHJULW\(Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 2015).46 Two decades of conflict mediation through the OSCE Minsk Group have brought no 
result, and Azerbaijan considers the EU to be the sole actor that could broker a compromise (Babayev 2014, p. 
114). Russia, France and the United States, co-chairs of the Minsk Group, are seen by Azerbaijan as biased in 
favour of Armenia (De Waal 2010, pp. 104±5).47 As a result, Baku would rather see an EU representative in the 
Minsk Group, possibly an additional member beyond France.48  
The question of territorial integrity versus self-determination is especially complicated for the EU and 
Azerbaijan. While both territorial integrity and the right to self-determination are principles of international law, 
there is a contradiction between them (Goble in Goble & Ismayilov 2011, p. 29). Azerbaijan wants the EU to fully 
UHFRJQLVHDQGVXSSRUW$]HUEDLMDQ¶VWHUULWRULDOLQWHJULW\that is, to support the claim that Armenia should withdraw 
from the Nagorno-Karabakh region, and to place more pressure on Armenia to solve the conflict, for instance, 
through sanctions.49 The fact that both Azerbaijan and Armenia are EU partners through the EaP places Brussels 
in a difficult position, which could well explain its non-involvement (Popescu 2009, p. 472). Moreover, the EU 
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recognises both AzerbaijaQ¶VWHUULWRULDOLQWHJULW\DVZHOODV1DJRUQR-.DUDEDNK¶VULJKWWRVHOI-determination (Jahn 
in Reiter 2009, p. 279; øEUDKLPRYa, p. 106).50 
While in private meetings the Azerbaijani government does acknowledge that they realise there is not 
much the EU can do,.51 at a public level the government states it does not understand why the EU does not want 
to take a clear position on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh,52 or at least why not regarding the occupation of the 
other parts RI$]HUEDLMDQ¶VWHUULWRU\beyond Nagorno-Karabakh.53 This contradiction might be a way of adding 
pressure to the EU to become actively involved in the conflict resolution process. The government states that if 
bilateral relations are truly founded on principles of equality and partnership, the EU should acknowledge its 
SDUWQHU¶VWHUULWRULDOLQWHJULW\PRUHFOHDUO\ 
Azerbaijan has allocated significant resources to the resolution of the Nagarno-Karabakh conflict in its 
favour and uses a number of proactive strategies to include the issue on the agenda in its relations with the EU. 
The two discussed in the next section are the creation of a negative discourse, including the threat of war; and 
linkage and lobbying/ Public Relations.  
 
$]HUEDLMDQ¶VVWUDWHJLHVnegative discourse and a new threat of war  
One of Baku¶VUKHWRULFDOVWUDWHJLHVLVWRDFFXVHWKH(8RILQFRQVLVWHQWbehaviour and double standards: compared 
to its hands-off approach to Nagorno-Karabakh, the EU is engaged actively in the conflicts in Kosovo, South-
Ossetia and Abkhazia, and has strongly condemned 5XVVLD¶VDQQH[DWLRQRI&ULPHDDQGits support of separatists 
in Ukraine.54 %DNX¶VGLVFRQWHQWZLWK WKH(8¶VUHOXFWDQFH WREHFRPHGLUHFWO\ LQYROYHG LQ WKHUHVROXWLRQRI WKH
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is translated into a rhetoric featuring a negative undertone, in which the EU is accused 
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of not listening to Azerbaijan, and of not understanding the problems confronting the country.55 According to an 
EU representative, the Azerbaijani government raises this issue µin every single meeting we have¶DVNLQJthe EU 
µWREHPRUH VSHFLILFRUYRFDORU ILUPRQGHIHQGLQJ$]HUEDLMDQ¶VSRVLWLRQ¶.56 In its public statements the Baku 
government often blames the EU (and the United States) for not doing more to solve the conflict.57 Possibly 
EHFDXVHRI%DNX¶VµEDODQFLQJ¶VWUDWHJ\Russia escapes such censure .58  
At the 2015 Riga Summit, a series of tensions erupted in relation to the way the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict was addressed by the EU. One Azerbaijani MP explained that Azerbaijan felt its policy priorities were 
not being taken into consideration in the Association Agreement that was under discussion at the time; in 
particular, Nagorno-Karabakh was not given the consideration Azerbaijan felt was due (Rajabova 2015a). 
Tensions were manifest by the Azerbaijani Deputy Speaker of Parliament, who called WKH(8¶VµGRXEOHVWDQGDUGV¶
UHJDUGLQJWKHLVVXHRIWHUULWRULDOLQWHJULW\µGLVUHVSHFWIXO¶of Azerbaijan.59 The EU reiterated its previous position 
on the matter²that its involvement was strictly within the OSCE Minsk framework²and evaluated the meeting 
in Riga rather positively. The President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, said that it was µnot realistic¶ for 
the EU to offer military support, and that the only resolution to the conflict would be through dialogue (Rajabova 
E7KHUHZHUHUXPRXUVWKDW$]HUEDLMDQGLGQ¶WZDQWWRVLJQWKH5LJD'HFODUDWLRQDWWKHHQGRIWKHsummit. 
Eventually, Azerbaijan did sign, but according to one inWHUYLHZHHWKLVZDVµRQO\IRUWKHVDNHRIDJUHHPHQWDV
SDUWQHUV¶60 Azerbaijan issued an additional statement in which it declared that the country continued to expect the 
(8WRWDNHDµILUPSRVLWLRQ¶UHJDUGLQJWHUULWRULDOLQWHJULW\61  
The Baku government also actively voiced its criticism of the EU and EU member states that failed to 
explicitly support the Azerbaijani view on Nagorno-Karabakh. When the London-based think tank Chatham 
House organised a meeting on the conflict in July 2015 and invited a representative from the self-declared republic 
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of Nagorno-Karabakh itself, the government-led media in Azerbaijan publicised its displeasure.62 One of the 
actors involved was the European Azerbaijan Society (TEAS) lobby group,63 which operates in Brussels and other 
European capitals, with its headquarters in London. The British ambassador to Azerbaijan was summoned to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Baku to provide a clarification²one of several summons issued when Baku was 
dissatisfied with how the conflict was being framed in the UK.64 As a result, the British Embassy in Baku made a 
SXEOLFVWDWHPHQW VD\LQJ LWKDGµQR WLHVZLWK VHSDUDWLVWV LQ1agorno-Karabakh¶65 and Chatham House publicly 
distanced itself from the µseparatist claims¶ of Nagorno-Karabakh and DQGWKH,QVWLWXWH¶V'LUHFWRUZURWHDOHWWHU
VWDWLQJWKDW&KDWKDP+RXVHUHVSHFWV$]HUEDLMDQ¶V³VRYHUHLJQW\LQGHSHQGHQFHDQGWHUULWRULDOLQWHJULW\´ 66 67.  
The final discursive strategy used by the Azerbaijan government has been the threat of re-starting the 
war. In 2010, the president and members of parliament made references in a speech to using military means in 
case negotiations would not lead to a solution (Goble & Ismayilov 2011, p. 165; Day.Az 2010). In August 2014, 
3UHVLGHQW$OL\HY¶VWKUHDWVWR$UPHQLDvia Twitter received attention in the international media (Liston 2014).On 
2n April 2016 violence resumed with four days of clashes between Azerbaijani forces and military in Nagorno-
Karabakh, with many casualties on both sides. While a new ceasefire was agreed between Armenia and Azerbaijan 
on 5th April (Walker 2016), there has been almost daily reporting of violations by both sides up to the time of 
writing. While obviously a war is not desirable, Jahn has warned that Azerbaijan may decide to undertake military 
action in the absence of any progress by diplomatic means and if the de facto independence of Nagorno-Karabakh 
continues (Jahn in Reiter 2009, p. 267). As one interviewee had remarked, some actors on the Azerbaijan side 
have come to believe that this conflict cannot be solved peacefully, and perhaps a war is needed to resolve it.68 
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Yet, these threats of violence do not seem to have increased Azerbaijan¶V bargaining power in its relations with 
the EU: the international community does not appear to view military action as a serious option.69. Azerbaijan has 
invested heavily in its military in recent years (SIPRI 2015)70 However, Russia still has a military base in Armenia 
(Pototskaya 2014, p. 301; Pashayeva in Chiragov et al. 2015, p. 41) and it is believed by the government in Baku   
that Moscow would provide aid to Armenia if it were attacked by Azerbaijan, considering WKHWZRVWDWHV¶
defence pact LQZKLFK5XVVLDVD\VWRJXDUDQWHH$UPHQLD¶VWHUULWRULDOLQWHJULW\.71 The Azerbaijani military would 
not be able to match this power.  
 
Linkage and Public Relations/lobbying  
7KH%DNXJRYHUQPHQW¶Vsecond proactive foreign policy strategy with regard to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
is that of linkage. For Azerbaijanis, the elites as well as the majority of the population, Nagorno-Karabakh is of 
great importance, and the conflict is perceived to influence all other aspects of its foreign policy:as one interviewee 
explained, the conflict was such a huge problem for the country because the state is not in control of 15-20% of 
its territory. Therefore, only once this matter is resolved can the country focus on other issues such as the much 
needed economic reform (EU Council 2000: 5). In 2000, then EU High Representative for Common Foreign and 
Security Policy Javier Solana acknowledged that the settlement of the conflict µis a priority since without a 
settlement, normal political development and economic recovery will be virtually impossible to achieve¶ (EU 
Council 2000, p. 5).72 The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is therefore very much present in the political discourse of 
Azerbaijan, both on a foreign policy as well as domestic level. For Baku as well as for Yerevan, the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict µdominates the foreign policies ... with each seeking allies to strengthen their position¶ (German 
2007, p. 366).  
Since Nagorno-Karabakh is perceived and presented as underlying other aspects of foreign policy too, 
the conflict ultimately influences relations between the EU and Azerbaijan on many fronts. For instance, 
negotiations over the Strategic Modernisation Partnership73 were put on hold because the two sides could not 
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agree on how the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict would be addressed. While Azerbaijan wanted to copy the references 
to territorial integrity from the PCA, the EU wanted Nagorno-Karabakh excluded from the agreement.74 This 
linkage between the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and other policy domains can be seen as a negotiation strategy 
by Azerbaijan, allowing it to halt developments in other areas of cooperation that the EU considers to be of greater 
importance. Linkage, in essence, is used to create a GHDGORFNHOVHZKHUHDQGWRHQIRUFHRQH¶Vown objectives.  
Some experts question whether or not the conflict really underlies all other aspects of foreign policy, or 
if it is only presented as such, to serve another purpose. For example, according to Blum, Nagorno-Karabakh 
serves as a µsource of social cohesion and state legitimacy¶ (Blum in Sperling et al. 2003, p. 33).  Some would 
indeed believe that the governments of both Armenia and Azerbaijan use the conflict to divert public attention 
from other issues, such as the standard of living and the absence of political freedoms.75 In Azerbaijan the conflict 
is presented as the core issue, which allows Armenia to be blamed for many problems. For both governments, it 
seems convenient to maintain the status quo and not resolve the conflict, or at least not yet;76  and the conflict 
enhances the legitimacy of both governments (George in Wooden and Stefes 2009: 85).  
Pressure is also brought to bear on the EU through lobbying and Public Relations activities in Brussels 
and other European capitals. In particular the TEAS, as mentioned previously, is an active player in publicising 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict within the EU.77 An EU representative explained that pro-Armenian and pro-
Azerbaijani lobbies are active to influence the European Parliament.78 Both lobbies are also actively attempting 
to engage with the EEAS but one source within the EU did not consider this influence to be significant.79 It has 
not been possible to find further relevant evidence on the influence of the Azerbaijani lobby on agenda-setting in 
relations with the EU. However, as already mentioned in the case study on DHR promotion, there is extensive 
evidence on how such activities influence other areas of cooperation (ESI 2012; Knaus 2015). 
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Agenda-setting: defensive and offensive power  
Azerbaijan has applied several policy strategies to engage the EU more actively in the conflict, but to no avail. 
Thus, $]HUEDLMDQ¶Vproactive strategies have not yielded any offensive power so far, highlighting the limits of the 
UHJLPH¶Vinfluence. As with DHR promotion, the 2015 economic decline likely reduces the potential for offensive 
power even further. The EU, on the other hand, can be said to have significant defensive power in that it has 
managed to maintain its position of non-involvement, despite the pressure exerted by Baku. Although one can 
only speculate, potentially the one threat to this defensive power is $]HUEDLMDQ¶s pointing out of discrepancies in 
WKH(8¶V roles as conflict mediator and regional actor, and its non-engagement in this specific conflict 
 
Conclusion and further discussion 
This essay has assessed LIDQGKRZ$]HUEDLMDQ¶V IRUHLJQSROLF\ is influenced by the EU. It founG WKDW%DNX¶V
policies are indeed formulated SDUWLDOO\ LQ UHVSRQVH WR WKH(8¶V DSSURDFK DW OHDVW IRU WKH WZRFRQWHVWHG FDVH
studies where the Azerbaijani government feels its interests are not sufficiently defended: DHR promotion  and 
agenda-setting of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The government has become a much more assertive player in 
international politics especially in recent years, and this affects how it interacts with the EU, and on what foreign 
policy strategies it uses to advance its own interests in these policy domains.  
The essay highlighted that the viewpoints of the EU and the Azerbaijani government (not necessarily the 
FRXQWU\¶VFLWL]HQVon these policy areas are conflicting, and their strong adherence to these views does not always 
seem rational on the basis of their material interests. Yet their respective views and policies are (at least partially) 
informed by their different legacies, which can explain the determination of both sides. Certain legacies are so 
fundamental for an actor¶V legitimacy and credibility that no compromises are possible. 7KH(8¶V DHR promotion 
policies are strongly based on its perception of its role as a norm promoter. %UXVVHOV¶SUHIHUHQFHIRUthe 26&(¶V 
leading role in the Nagorno-Karabakh FRQIOLFWUHVROXWLRQSURFHVVFDQEHVHHQLQOLJKWRIWKH(8¶VVHOI-perception 
as a supporting actor; yet this clashes with its role as regional security actor. $]HUEDLMDQ¶s behaviour and policy 
choices in relations with the EU seem to be largely founded on the three notions of national independence, 
µbalancing¶, and internal regime legitimacy. 7KHJRYHUQPHQWQHHGVWRUHVSRQGWRWKH(8¶VSROLFLHVRQ'+5DQG
Nagorno-Karabakh in order to secure regime legitimacy, by highlighting notions of national independence while, 
at the same time, HQJDJLQJLQDGHOLFDWHµEDODQFLQJ¶DFWWRPDLQWDLQDPLDEOHUHODWLRQVZLWKWKH(8DQGDOORWKHU




To do this, both reactive and proactive policy strategies have been used in recent years. Concerning DHR 
promotion policies, on the one hand, the Azerbaijani government has responded to EU criticism and ignored its 
pressure; on the other hand, it has also tried to actively influence EU policies, through lobbying and Public 
Relations activities, and through undermining relations between the EU and Azerbaijani civil society 
organisations. To put the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on the agenda, this essay finds that the Azerbaijani 
authorities have applied different strategies to advocate more active EU engagement: the creation of a negative 
discourse on the EU, linkage to other areas, and lobbying and PR activities. 
TKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\VWUDWHJLHVLQUHODWLRQVZLWKWKH(8 has mixed track record. The two case 
studies showed that reactive and proactive policy strategies lead to different outcomes in terms of success. In 
general, the proactive actor²the EU in case of DHR promotion, and Azerbaijan concerning agenda-setting of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict²did not achieve their goals; but the reactive side did, as they were able to resist each 
RWKHU¶VSUHVVXUH, but could QRWDFWLYHO\LQIOXHQFHDQGVKDSHWKHRWKHU¶VDJHQGD. A possible explanation for this is 
that it may be easier to defend the status quo than to bring about reform. One exception is %DNX¶V lobbying effort 
in Brussels to undermine the implementation of DHR promotion policies, with recent scandals exposing the range 
of these lobby activities. 
The outcomes can be interpreted using the conceptVRIµGHIHQVLYH¶DQGµRIIHQVLYH¶SRZHUGoldmann in 
Goldmann & Sjöstedt 1979, pp. 13±4). Offensive power is the more traditional interpretation of power, whereby 
one actor can influence another; defensive power refers to the situation whereby one DFWRUFDQGHI\DQRWKHU¶V
attempts to gain influence. This differentiation between offensive and defensive power explains why Azerbaijan 
has more influence than could perhaps be expected on the basis of the traditional balance of power in these 
relations, aQGWKHDFWRUV¶relative sizes. Azerbaijan has few opportunities to acquire offensive power in relations 
with the powerful EU, but it has been investing heavily in (often unconventional) reactive strategies that have 
given it an unusual amount of defensive power. This investment in defensive power is crucial for the regime: 
DHR promotion is perceived by the regime as a direct threat to its survival (the external dimension); and the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is FHQWUDO LQPDLQWDLQLQJ WKHUHJLPH¶V OHJLWLPDF\ on a domestic level (the internal 
dimension). 
Furthermore, this all suggests a certain degree of µLQVWUXPHQWDOLVDWLRQ¶ RI WKH SULQFLSOHV RI QDWLRQDO
independence and balancing in relations with the EU, for purposes of regime legitimacy. The case studies in this 





H[WHUQDODFWRU¶VHQJDJHPHnt which could threaten regime legitimacy. Second, and more interestingly, the case of 
Nagorno-Karabakh showed that the Azerbaijani government also used different proactive policy strategies to 
further its own interests. Here, on the contrary, LWLQVWUXPHQWDOLVHGWKHH[WHUQDODFWRU¶Vdisengagement in order to 
enhance regime legitimacy. Even though these pro-active strategies were overall not successful, it demonstrates 
that aV VXFK UHJLPH OHJLWLPDF\ QDWLRQDO LQGHSHQGHQFH DQG µEDODQFLQJ¶ DUH both a source and a goal for 
$]HUEDLMDQ¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\established LQUHVSRQVHWRWKH(8¶VSROLFLHVWKDWPD\XQGHUPLQHthese very principles.  
Lastly, the essay has found that not only has the EU not succeeded in bringing about a policy more in 
line with its own agenda, but through its policies, the EU has (possibly unintentionally and indirectly) in fact 
UHLQIRUFHG$]HUEDLMDQ¶VHPSKDVLVRQQDWLRQDO LQGHSHQGHQFH)RU'+5SURPRWLRQ WKLV LV WKHFDVHEHFDXVH WKH
government in Baku tried WRµQHXWUDOLVH¶WKHVHHIIRUWVZKLFKFRXOGSRVHDWKUHDWWRWKHUHJLPHand regarding the 
Nagorno-Karabakh FRQIOLFW $]HUEDLMDQ LQWHUSUHWV WKH (8¶V ODFN RI HQJDJHPHQW DV LQFRQVLVWHQW DQG ELDVHG
EHKDYLRXUDIILUPLQJ%DNX¶VYLHZVWKDW too close cooperation with Brussels is undesirable. 
Why is this more significant an outcome for Azerbaijan than for the EU? First, Azerbaijan being a 
relatively small and young, post-Soviet country, it is a remarkable achievement to be able to resist EU pressure, 
with the EU being a much larger, more established partner. Second, while Azerbaijan has perhaps not yet achieved 
positive outcomes in the area of putting Nagorno-Karabakh on the agenda, it is slowly adding successes to its 
track records in relations with the EU overall. At the same time, it remains to be seen what medium and long-term 
HIIHFWWKHHFRQRPLFGRZQWXUQZLOOKDYHRQSROLF\PDNLQJDQGWKHFRXQWU\¶VEDUJDLQLQJSRZHULQUHODWLRQV
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